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Abstract: Thomas Aquinas’ intentions in his position that God acts through secondary causes are both laudable
and correct. In affirming God’s action within secondary causes Thomas intended to affirm true freedom and
contingency in the world and the creatures’ limited participation in God’s creative power. But his interpretation
of these topics rests on assumptions about divinity that subvert his intentions. This article summarizes Thomas’
analysis and discusses the principal difficulties with his interpretation of God’s action. It then presents an
interpretation of how Alfred North Whitehead’s position on divine action avoids these difficulties and achieves
a more coherent understanding of God’s action in the world, even though it too requires revision. If Whitehead’s
metaphysics is revised to think of creativity as the divine life rather than as ultimately distinct from God, then
it, too, presents God as sharing the divine life with creatures by endowing them with the creativity and freedom
to create themselves on the divinely-given ground of possibility. Thomas’ intentions and a revised Whiteheadian
interpretation of divine action are compatible and complement each other on the topic of divine action in and
through creatures and on the idea of existence as participation in the divine life.
Keywords: Thomas Aquinas, Whitehead, God‘s action, creativity, possibility, divine knowledge, freedom,
contingency

The topic of God’s action in the world is a complex one that could conceivably include not just the doctrines of
creation and providence, but also grace, salvation and eschatology. Although a complete discussion would
touch on all of these, due to limitations of space I will restrict my discussion to divine action as considered
in the traditional topics of creation and providence. When creation was thought of as a singular event that
happened “once upon a time” in the past, the doctrine of providence focused on how God continued to
interact with the world God had created. But when creation is understood to be an ongoing process, the
concerns of the doctrines of creation and providence tend to merge or at least to be very strongly related.
They are also closely related in the theology of Thomas Aquinas, but in a different way.
Thomas Aquinas’ understanding of God’s action in the world is intimately connected to his understanding
of causality, God’s knowledge, God’s will, and how God creates. It is a testimony to his consistency that all
these topics are connected so closely. I would affirm that Thomas’ intentions in his position that God acts
through secondary causes are both laudable and correct. But Thomas’ interpretation of these topics rests
on certain assumptions about divinity that I believe subvert his intentions. I will first summarize Thomas’
analysis and then discuss the principal difficulties with his interpretation of God’s action, especially
through secondary causes. I will then present my interpretation of how Alfred North Whitehead’s position
on divine action avoids these difficulties and achieves a more coherent understanding of God’s action in
the world, even though it too requires revision. I will conclude with the claim that Thomas’ intentions and a
revised Whiteheadian interpretation of divine action are compatible and that this offers a locus for fruitful
discussion between Thomists and process theologians and philosophers.
*Corresponding author: Thomas E. Hosinski: University of Portland, E-mail: hosinski@up.edu
© 2015 Thomas E. Hosinski, licensee De Gruyter Open.
This work is licensed under the Creative Commons Attribution-NonCommercial-NoDerivs 3.0 License.
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Thomas Aquinas on God’s Action in the World
Thomas affirms that God is present and active in all things, “as an agent is present to that upon which it
acts.”1 This presence and action of God takes several forms in Thomas’ analysis. It is expressed in all four
types of causality, as well as in Thomas’ affirmation that God both sustains secondary causes in existence
and acts through them. God is the “final cause” or “end” (goal), drawing every operation of created agents
to God. God is the first cause and necessary being, the source of all secondary and contingent efficient
causes. God is the “unmoved mover” that in an ultimate sense “moves” all secondary causes to action. God
is the ultimate “formal cause” in the sense that God gives to all secondary causes their “forms,” enabling
and empowering them to be agents and to act in specific ways. God is also the Creator of all material causes
(or matter). And finally, as Creator God conserves and sustains all material and secondary causes in their
forms and powers. From all of this, Thomas concludes:
. . . it follows that God works intimately in all things. For this reason in Holy Scripture the operations of nature are attributed to God as operating in nature, according to Job 10:11: “Thou hast clothed me with skin and flesh; Thou hast put me
together with bones and sinews.”2

This is a lovely vision of God’s presence and action in the created world and so long as one does not pursue
critical questions too far, it seems to allow us to say that God acts in and through secondary causes. Each
is active in its own way: God in the ways I have just summarized; while secondary causes, Thomas asserts,
exercise true causal power as efficient causes.3 This gives the appearance of allowing the creatures of the
world an independence and integrity of action of their own.4 But the position Thomas seems to intend
here is actually subverted by several of his assumptions about divinity, his conclusions regarding God’s
knowledge and will, and his understanding of how God creates.
As is well known, Thomas argues that God creates through God’s knowledge. For creatures, to be is
to be known by God. In order to grasp the difficulties resulting from this position, we need to consider
what Thomas says about God’s knowledge. First, Thomas states that in God the act of understanding—the
operation producing knowledge—must be God’s essence and God’s being. This follows from God being pure
act (without potentiality) and from God’s perfection, “because the act of understanding is the perfection
and act of the one understanding.”5 If God’s act of understanding were something other than God’s essence
and being, then that “something other” would be the perfection and act of the divine essence and the divine
essence would stand in a relation of potentiality to an act other than itself. All of this is impossible since
God must be pure act and perfect. Therefore, God’s act of understanding must be God’s essence and being.
From this conclusion a number of implications follow. If God’s act of understanding is God’s essence
and being, then God’s knowledge must have exactly the same attributes as God’s essence and being: it
must be simple, perfect, unchanging, eternal, not in dependence on anything other than God, unaffected
by anything other than God, necessary, and so on. Thus God’s knowledge of all things is not dependent
on anything other than God, and this is possible, Thomas argues, because in knowing Godself God knows
all things.6 If this were not true, then God would be in dependence on creatures for God’s knowledge and
this would compromise God’s perfection, aseity, and absoluteness. Furthermore, God’s knowledge must be
creative, the cause of all things.7 But how can this be? In our experience, knowing depends on the existence
1 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 8, a. 1. All quotations are from the English Dominican translation (New York: Benzinger
Brothers, Inc., 1947).
2 Ibid., 1a, q. 105, a. 5.
3 See Ibid., Ia, q. 103, a. 6 & ad 2.
4 Elizabeth A. Johnson, for example, has defended Thomas’ position on secondary causality as forming a basis for a contemporary theology of divine providence that can affirm chance, randomness, and “the free play of the undetermined realms of
matter and spirit” in the universe as understood by contemporary science; Johnson, “Does God Play Dice?,” Theological Studies
57 (1996): 3-18 (quotation from p. 18).
5 Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 14, a. 4.
6 Ibid., Ia, q. 14, a. 5, 6, & 7.
7 Ibid., Ia, q. 14, a. 8.
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of the known thing; or, as Aristotle puts it, “the knowable thing is prior to knowledge, and is its measure.”8
It seems, then, that knowledge cannot be the cause of the known thing. Thomas answers this objection by
arguing that God’s knowledge is fundamentally different than our knowledge. What Aristotle says is true
of human knowledge, but God’s knowledge stands, as it were, on the other side of the known object: God’s
knowledge is prior to and the measure of all knowable things, because God creates all knowable things by
God’s knowledge of them.9 God’s knowledge is like that of an architect who builds a house and knows what
it will be before the house actually exists.
If God’s knowledge is perfect, immutable, necessary, not in dependence on the world, and the cause of
all things that exist, does this not imply that God’s knowledge imposes necessity on things? Does this not
imply that there can be no truly contingent events? And most importantly, does this not imply that there
is no freedom in the universe, not even in human beings? This would be a serious problem for Christian
theology, because the reality of human freedom is absolutely crucial to the understanding of sin, which in
turn forms the foundation for the doctrine of salvation and the understanding of the person and work of
Jesus Christ. Therefore Thomas must resolve this apparent problem. He does so in an ingenious way, though
the solution has serious difficulties. He argues that since God’s knowledge is eternal, and since “eternity,
being simultaneously whole, comprises all time,”10 God knows all contingent events (including all of
what are to us future contingent events) as present facts; and this means that God’s creative knowledge
of contingent events is certain and necessary without imposing necessity on them. That is, the events in
relation to their proximate causes in the temporal world are truly contingent in that they might have been
otherwise; but since in eternity God “sees” not just possible outcomes of various proximate causes, but
also what will actually happen, God’s knowledge is necessary and certain. This is similar to the way in
which we can know past and present contingent events with certainty and necessity. For example, I can
know with certainty that as I wrote this sentence I was sitting at my computer, even though I also know
that I was perfectly free then to stand up and walk around. In this way, Thomas believes, both contingency
and freedom are preserved without violating the necessity, immutability, perfection, and independence of
God’s knowledge.
Thomas even provides an interesting analogy for God’s necessary knowledge of future contingent
events.11 When you are travelling on a road, you cannot see what lies ahead of you on that road in the
future, nor can you know who else in the future will start travelling on that road. But if you could get up
high enough so that your vision could take in the entire road, then you could see at once all the travelers on
the road. In a similar way, because eternity comprises all of time, God can know all past, present, and future
contingent events as facts, and so know them with certainty and necessity, even though they occur as truly
contingent events in the temporal world.
This analogy, however, and the underlying understanding of eternity’s relation to time, has a major
flaw: it treats time as if it were space. Space is already fully extended in its three dimensions,12 so that for
a sufficiently small finite segment of it one could see it all if one could gain a sufficiently distant vantage
point. For example, an orbiting satellite can take in the entire length of the I-5 interstate highway from the
Canadian to the Mexican borders along the west coast of the United States. Time, however, is fundamentally
different from space in that, so far as we can judge from our experience, it is not already fully extended; the
future is not yet actual, as the past and present are. The future is real, in the sense that we know something
will occur; but it has not yet occurred, and so the future is real only as possibility and not as fact. It is hard
to understand, then, how even God can know the future as fact, since it does not yet exist as fact. Or, if one
wants to hold that God in eternity does know it as fact, it is hard to understand how this can avoid imposing
8 Aristotle, Metaphysics, IX 1 (as cited by Thomas Aquinas, Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 14, a. 8 obj. 3).
9 See Summa Theologiae, Ia, q. 14, a. 8 ad 3. Thomas adds that God’s knowledge is the cause of all things insofar as God’s will is
joined to it. See Ibid., Ia, q. 14, a. 8 & a. 9 ad 3. All of the major points made in his discussion of God’s knowledge are paralleled
in his discussion of God’s will; see Ibid., Ia, q. 19.
10 Ibid., Ia, q. 14, a. 13; see also Ia, q. 10, a. 2 ad 4.
11 See Ibid., Ia, q. 14, a. 13 ad 3.
12 I am aware that according to the current scientific understanding of the universe space is continually expanding, but for the
purpose of discussing Thomas’ analogy, we may safely ignore this.
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necessity on events. How can I be truly free to stand up and walk around ten minutes from now if God
knows from all eternity that I will be sitting? I am not truly free to do anything other than what God knows
from all eternity I will do. If I were, then I would have the power to make God’s knowledge mistaken; and
this cannot be, because it would compromise the completeness and perfection of God’s knowledge. Thus
despite Thomas’ attempt to affirm the truth of freedom and contingency in the world while retaining the
position that God’s creative knowledge is necessarily eternal, independent, infallible, and unchanging, his
solution is not coherent and does not succeed.
Thomas’ important argument for the understanding of God’s action in the world through natural
agents unfortunately also suffers from incoherence. In Thomas’ thought this is expressed as the efficacy of
secondary causes. There is no doubt that Thomas intended to affirm that created secondary causes actually
have the power to cause, and thus participate in the divine creative power. For example, in discussing God’s
providential governance of the world, Thomas says:
. . . whatsoever causes [God] assigns to certain effects, He gives them the power to produce those effects. . . . [T]here are
certain intermediaries of God’s providence, for He governs things inferior by superior, not because of any defect in His
power, but by reason of the abundance of His goodness; so that the dignity of causality is imparted even to creatures.13

Thomas does not mean that the agents of the created world are autonomous and independent causes
operating apart from God. They are in fact agents of God’s action: God “governs some things by means
of others.” And again, “God so governs things that He makes some of them to be causes of others in
government,” allowing them to share in “the perfection of causality.”14 I believe Thomas intends to support
a very important and beautiful idea here, the idea that creatures participate in a limited way in God’s own
creativity, or to state it more generally, that created beings exist by participating in the divine being.
But there is a major incoherence in the way Thomas expresses this idea when we consider it in relation
to God’s eternal, unchanging knowledge and will. In discussing the will of God, Thomas says:
Since then the divine will is perfectly efficacious, it follows not only that things are done, which God wills to be done, but
also that they are done in the way that He wills. Now God wills some things to be done necessarily, some contingently, so
that there be a right order in things for the perfection of the universe. Therefore, to some effects He has attached unfailing
necessary causes, from which the effects follow necessarily; but to others defectible and contingent causes, from which
the effects arise contingently. Hence it is not because the proximate causes are contingent that the effects willed by God
happen contingently; but God has prepared contingent causes for them because He has willed that they should happen
contingently.15

This sounds so reasonable: there truly are contingent events because God wills them to happen contingently
and “prepares” contingent secondary causes for them. But how can the contingent secondary causes truly be
contingent in their effects and how can the contingent secondary causes truly have any independence and
integrity of action of their own, if God from all eternity knows and wills the outcome? Since neither God’s
will nor God’s knowledge can change (without compromising God’s perfection, aseity, and absoluteness,
which is unthinkable for Thomas), there is no real possibility of the contingent secondary causes having
any other effects than the ones God knows and wills from eternity. How can I really have freedom and
independence to do something other than what God from all eternity knows with certain and unchanging
knowledge and wills with perfect efficaciousness? We can call this contingency and free will all we want, we
can say ceaselessly that divine providence does not impose necessity on those things God wills to happen
contingently,16 but so long as God’s knowledge and God’s will must be eternal and unchanging, creative
and perfectly efficacious, the result is indistinguishable from absolute determinism.
Thomas’ intent cannot be faulted: to affirm free will, contingency and the power of secondary causes
in the universe is the correct position for Christian theology. It is correct to hold that God works through
13
14
15
16

Ibid., Ia, q. 22, a. 3.
Ibid., Ia, q, 103, a. 6 & ad 2.
Ibid., Ia, q, 19, a. 8.
Ibid., Ia, q. 22, a. 4 and Aquinas, Summa Contra Gentiles, III, 72.7.
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secondary causes. And to hold that God allows the created agents of the universe to participate in God’s
own creative power by granting them the ability to act as true causes is a beautiful expression of the ancient
Christian conviction that all things exist by participating in the being or life of God. But the assumptions
and implications of the Greek metaphysics that controls Thomas’ discussion subvert his intentions and
create serious problems for the positions he wants to uphold. The trick of thinking that all of future time
is somehow already “fact” for God in eternity—so that God can know every future event and being with
perfect, necessary, and unchanging knowledge and will them with perfect efficaciousness, thus bringing
them into being without imposing necessity on them and absolutely determining the course of universal
history—this is in fact a trick. It is metaphysical sleight of hand distracting us from a major incoherence. It
does not work.

Whitehead and God’s Action in the World
I cannot rehearse the details of Whitehead’s metaphysics here. Suffice it to say that in Whitehead’s
metaphysics God’s primary action on the world is by the organization, valuation, presentation, and “lure”
of possibilities. The Primordial Nature of God, Whitehead says, is the unconditioned grasping and valuation
of all potentials or possibilities.17 This function of God establishes the basic order necessary for there to
be any course of actual events, any universe, whatsoever. The order is the outcome of God’s valuation
of all potentials or possibilities. This establishes not just the general metaphysical conditions and more
specific conditions governing our universe,18 but also the relevance or irrelevance of every possibility to any
particular standpoint in the actual world. Every possibility is included in God’s organization and valuation
of the possibilities for the universe. This means that for any standpoint in the universe—which is, of course,
a possibility that can be envisioned apart from any experience of the actual course of events—the relevant
possibilities are “graded” in an order of value that reflects God’s preference: there will be one possibility
for that specific situation that God values most highly, with varying valuations for the other possibilities,
including one God values least (or even abhors).
God’s organization of possibilities is thus the ultimate ground of both order and novelty. God’s valuation
of all possibilities establishes the ground of order (which is thus fundamentally an aesthetic order19) and
the Primordial Nature of God serves as the limitless source of novel possibilities. God creates each actual
entity in the universe not by determining what it shall be or by foreseeing what it shall be, but by making it
really possible: endowing it with its possibilities and its ‘initial subjective aim,’ its ‘living immediacy’ as a
becoming subject. The free and autonomous becoming of the actual entity in its situation is influenced by
the attractiveness of the possibilities; the possibilities “lure” the actual entity to actualize them. The ‘initial
subjective aim’ initially orients the becoming actual entity toward selecting the possibility God values most
highly. This is because the ‘initial subjective aim’ also constitutes the actual entity’s initial standard of
value, enabling it to experience and respond to value, and this is initially in harmony with God’s valuation
of the possibilities open to that process of becoming.20
But the process of becoming is influenced by many factors in addition to the Primordial Nature of God.
All past actual entities (which, it ought to be remembered, are actualized possibilities) to one degree or
another influence the present process of becoming. In the course of its process of becoming, these other
influences may exert a higher relative weight than the influence of God’s valuation of the possibilities. The
becoming actual entity is free to alter its subjective aim and select any of the possibilities open to it, even
the one God abhors. Thus although God’s creative influence on every actual entity is necessary for that
actual entity to become, it is not determinative. In the end, the actual entity’s own selection or ‘decision’
17 See Whitehead, Process and Reality, 31; see also 40, 87-88, 247, 257, 344, 349.
18 Whitehead argues that God’s Primordial Nature is responsible not just for the general metaphysical conditions, but also for
more specific conditions, such as the dimensional character of the actual world. See Whitehead, Science and the Modern World,
255-57 and Process and Reality, 40, 46, 87-88, 108, 164, 207, 247, 257, 344-45.
19 See Whitehead, Religion in the Making, 101.
20 See Hosinski, Stubborn Fact, 164-76 for a detailed explanation of this point.

Brought to you by | University of Portland
Authenticated
Download Date | 2/9/17 10:47 PM

274

T.E. Hosinski

among the possibilities open to it is the ‘reason’ for what it becomes and that decision can be influenced in
a variety of ways.
God acts internally in the becoming of every actual entity, by making it really possible and luring it
toward actualizing the possibility God values most highly. God does not act externally upon actual entities
or “societies” of actual entities as a competing agent. Although developed differently, I believe this position
is quite similar to Thomas Aquinas’ intent in his argument that God acts in and through secondary causes.
But there are also several important differences between Whitehead’s and Thomas’ positions that allow
Whitehead’s position to avoid the incoherencies that, in my view, subvert Thomas’ intentions.
Most importantly, in Whitehead’s metaphysics God does not create actual entities through God’s eternal
and unchanging knowledge of them, but rather by envisioning every actual entity as possible and endowing
each of them with all they need to determine or create themselves. There is, in short, a distinction between
God’s understanding and God’s knowledge that reflects the distinction between mere possibility and fact.
In Whitehead’s metaphysics, God’s understanding of all possibilities is eternal and unchanging and this
makes possible an actual course of events and energizes every actual entity. But God’s knowledge arises
from God’s experience of what actual entities have done with the possibilities God presented to them. Thus
God’s knowledge does not occur as part of God’s role as Creator and can thus be dependent on creatures
without compromising God’s perfection and independence and autonomy in God’s role as Creator.
In Whitehead’s metaphysics, in other words, creation does not mean either foreseeing or determining
what any actual entity will be or what event will occur. Rather, divine creation is making possible an open
and unfinished universe which will participate in God’s creative power by completing or creating itself on
the divinely-given ground of possibility.21 Actual entities could not become without what they receive from
God, but what they become is the result of their own free selection from among the possibilities open to
them.
This view clearly implies that God cannot know the future (in the technical sense of the word ‘know’)
until actual entities in fact terminate their processes of becoming in their own ‘decisions.’ God’s knowledge
is dependent on the creatures of the world. God does not create through God’s knowledge of what the
creature is or will be, but rather through the presentation of what it might be and the aim at becoming. The
temporal actual entities create and determine themselves and God’s knowledge of them as facts arises from
receiving the completed actual entities into God’s own experience. This account of divine knowledge is
coherent with the ontology of actual entities and with Whitehead’s account of the possibility of knowledge
in higher-grade actual entities.22 A Thomist might object that if God’s knowledge occurs in dependence on
creatures, then it does compromise God’s absoluteness, perfection, and aseity and the entire understanding
of divinity. In response I would note that Whitehead is thinking with a different understanding of perfection
than the Greek philosophical tradition assumes. Perhaps the easiest way to explain this is by reference to
the divine attributes.
It is not often noted by critics of process theology that in Whitehead’s philosophy of God the Primordial
Nature of God has exactly the same attributes as the Christian tradition assigned to God. In the Primordial
Nature God is infinite, complete, unconditioned, absolutely free, eternal, unchanging and impassible.
These classical divine attributes express the conviction of both religious experience and philosophical
reflection that God is the ultimate ground and source of the universe. But the tradition absolutized these
attributes (in keeping with the Greek understanding of divinity) and tried to define all of God’s interaction
with the universe from this basis, as we see in the theology of Thomas Aquinas. Whitehead’s metaphysics,
in contrast, recognizes that the absolute aspect of God’s role as Creator is only a half-truth.
There is another aspect of God’s relation to the universe: if God is an actual entity, God must experience
what the actual universe has become, what it has done with the possibilities God presented to it, and in this
aspect God has the opposite attributes. Because of the nature of the universe and God’s ongoing experience
of it, God’s Consequent Nature is finite, incomplete, conditioned, partially determined, everlasting,
21 I am here already expressing a revision of Whitehead’s own interpretation of creativity, a revision I will explain below.
22 See Hosinski, Stubborn Fact, 110-24, 192-93 for a summary of Whitehead’s account of the ontological bases of knowing and
how his discussion of God’s knowledge coheres with this account.
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developing, and passible. These “relative” attributes—the opposite of God’s “absolute” attributes—do not
compromise God’s perfection, but show how God is the supreme illustration of the metaphysical principles,
not an exception to them.23 Just as all actual entities must experience the universe of past actual entities, so
does God; but in each attribute God is perfect in God’s receptivity. God may be finite, incomplete, conditioned,
partially determined, and so on, but in each case God receives all past actual entities completely and in
perfect sympathy, unlike the temporal actual entities and societies of the universe whose reception of past
actual entities is imperfect and marked by limitations of perspective and exclusion.24 This view does not
compromise God’s perfection but shows how God is the supreme illustration of the principles illustrated in
all actual entities. Thus God’s perfection is not compromised.
Because it is developed by analogy with the structure of actual entities, this understanding of the
distinct aspects of God’s relation to the universe and of the different attributes of God in each aspect is
a consistent and coherent metaphysical understanding of God. We can say that God is infinite and finite,
unconditioned and conditioned, absolutely free and partially determined, impassible and passible, and so
on,25 because we can specify which attribute applies to which aspect of God’s relation to and interaction
with the universe. We need not try to derive every aspect of God’s relation to the universe from God’s role
as Creator and the absolute attributes God must possess in that role. Whitehead’s metaphysics can show
quite precisely, in a way Nicholas of Cusa’s could not, how it is possible for God to be the “coincidence of
opposites.”
God acts in the universe, then, not by determining outcomes or by knowing what will occur, but rather
by making all things possible and luring the freedom of the temporal agents of the universe toward the best
possibility in their situations. I believe, however, that there is an incoherence in Whitehead’s position on
creativity that must be revised if his view of divine action is to be compatible with the intent of the Christian
tradition. In his book Religion in the Making, Whitehead wrote a sentence that has haunted me since I
first read it: “The world lives by its incarnation of God in itself.”26 But in Process and Reality Whitehead
separated creativity from God in a foundational way by stating that creativity is the metaphysical “ultimate”
and God is its “primordial, non-temporal accident.”27 God and the world, Whitehead wrote, are both “in
the grip of the ultimate metaphysical ground, the creative advance into novelty.”28 Partially in order to deal
with the problem of evil, Whitehead did not want the creativity of the universe, which drives all processes
of becoming, to be thought of as coming entirely from God. So although he held that “God is the aboriginal
instance of this creativity, and is therefore the aboriginal condition which qualifies its action,”29 he also
held that temporal actual entities are creative in their own right, not because their creativity is a gift from
God.
I believe that this separation of creativity from God subverts the profound implication of Whitehead’s
own insight in Religion in the Making that “the world lives by its incarnation of God in itself.” If we were
to revise Whitehead’s position, so that creativity were understood to be the divine life which God shares
with the temporal agents of the world, then Whitehead’s metaphysics would be rendered compatible with
the intent of the Christian theological tradition in its position on creatio ex nihilo and its affirmation of
monotheism, as Langdon Gilkey argued many years ago.30 It would then also be compatible with the intent
of Thomas Aquinas’ argument that God shares with creatures the power of creativity or causality in acting
through secondary causes.
23 See Whitehead, Process and Reality, 343: “. . .God is not to be treated as an exception to all metaphysical principles, invoked
to save their collapse. He is their chief exemplification.”
24 See Whitehead, Process and Reality, 345-46 and Hosinski, Stubborn Fact, 193-95.
25 See Whitehead’s “antitheses” between God and the world, which reveal that God has opposite attributes depending on
which aspect of God’s relation to the universe is being considered, in Process and Reality, 348.
26 Whitehead, Religion in the Making, 149.
27 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 7; see also 31, 88, 225, 349; and Hosinski, Stubborn Fact, 208-12 for an analysis of Whitehead’s
position on creativity.
28 Whitehead, Process and Reality, 349.
29 Ibid., 225.
30 See Gilkey, Reaping the Whirlwind, 112-14, 248-51, 300-18, 414 n34. See also Neville, Creativity and God.
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In affirming God’s action within secondary causes Thomas Aquinas’ intended to affirm true freedom
and contingency in the world and the creatures’ limited participation in God’s creative power. Whitehead’s
metaphysics affirms true freedom and contingency in the universe in its understanding of God as creating
by making possible an open and unfinished universe which is allowed to determine itself and complete
its creation in freedom. If Whitehead’s metaphysics is revised to think of creativity as the divine life rather
than as ultimately distinct from God, then it, too, presents God as sharing the divine life with creatures
by endowing them with the creativity and freedom to create themselves on the divinely-given ground of
possibility. In such a revised Whiteheadian metaphysics, no actual entity or society of actual entities can
become or exist without its creative basis, which comes directly from God; but each actual entity and society
enjoys a limited freedom to complete its own creation. God creates creatures as co-creators. I believe that
Thomas Aquinas’ intentions and a revised Whiteheadian metaphysics complement each other on the topic
of divine action in and through creatures and on the idea of existence as participation in the divine life. This
offers a topic on which Thomists and process theologians might have a fruitful discussion.
Finally, although I do not have the space to develop this point here, it seems clear to me that this topic
has important implications for understanding the importance of our care for the natural environment. Both
Whitehead and Thomas Aquinas affirm that God acts through all agents in the universe, not just human
beings. If we are persuaded that God is at work in nature, and even more that God values the natural world,
then it immediately becomes clear to us that there is a sacrality or sacredness to the natural world that
we dare not ignore or overlook. This in turn implies that our actions affecting the natural world have a
moral character. In fact the distinction between actions affecting human beings and actions affecting the
natural world is ultimately a false distinction. There is a unity to the universe and all our actions have
moral character and consequences, whether they are directed at other human beings or at the natural world
of which we are a part. Our treatment of the physical environment, then, becomes a religious question
of ultimate importance since God is at work in nature. There is a rich religious basis for the concerns of
environmental theology.
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